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Abstract: We use a novel tax mechanism – “rejected offer reassessment” – in laboratory 
experiments to discourage seller holdout and facilitate land assembly.  Under this mechanism if a 
landowner rejects a developer’s offer his taxable property value is reassessed to be equal to the 
rejected offer, increasing his taxes.  We find that, relative to a control treatment, rejected offer 
reassessment discourages the magnitude of seller holdout (but not its frequency) and increases the 
rate of successful land assembly by almost 60%.  It also increases the gains from trade by 22.1% 
relative to the control treatment, but the difference is not statistically significant. 
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1. Introduction 
 DeSantis, McCarter & Winn (2017) tested two self-assessment tax mechanisms to facilitate 
land assembly when properties are complementary inputs to a development project.2  The 
mechanisms achieved successful assembly in 83.3% of negotiations, capturing more than 90% of 
the available surplus.  However, self-assessment taxation may be politically unpopular because it 
binds a landowner to sell at his self-assessed price.   
We consider an alternative tax mechanism, “rejected offer reassessment” (ROR).  Under 
ROR – proposed by Miceli, Segerson & Sirmans (2008) – if a landowner rejects a developer’s 
offer the government takes the offer as a lower bound on his subjective value for the property and 
reassesses the taxable value of the property at the rejected offer.  Thus, strategic holdout is costly 
for landowners and successful assembly is promoted. 
We conduct laboratory experiments to test the efficacy of ROR at discouraging holdout 
and facilitating land assembly.  We find that, compared to a control treatment, ROR increases the 
assembly rate by 58.4% and the gains from trade by 22.1%.  The effect on assembly is statistically 
significant, but the effect on gains from trade is not. 
2. Experiment Design 
We conducted experiments for one control (Baseline) and one experimental treatment 
(ROR).  Our experimental design for Baseline follows DeSantis, McCarter & Winn (2017), and 
we refer the reader to that paper for a detailed description.  Each treatment consisted of 30 
negotiations conducted in three sessions with 10 negotiations each. 
                                                          
2 Holdout has been observed in laboratory experiments by, e.g., Cadigan, Schmitt, Shupp, & Swope (2009, 2011), 
Swope, Wielgus, Schmitt & Cadigan (2011), Parente & Winn (2012), Collins & Isaac (2012), Zillante, Schwarz, & 
Read (2014), Swope, Cadigan & Schmitt (2014) and Winn & McCarter (2017).  Brooks & Lutz (2016) and Portillo 
(2017) report field data consistent with seller holdout. 
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 Negotiation proceeded in groups of five participants: one developer (buyer) and four 
landowners (sellers).  The sellers were assigned values for their property, while the buyer was 
assigned a value for the combination of all four properties.  Values were denominated in Economic 
Currency Units (ECU, denoted “$”).  Sellers (Buyers) received $1 US for $16,500 ($60,000) ECU.  
The exchange rates were private information. 
All values were drawn from uniform distributions and rounded to the nearest thousand.  
The sellers’ (buyer’s) distribution had support [$100,000, $150,000] ([$300,000, $1,250,000]).   
These distributions were common knowledge, but the participants’ value draws were private 
information. Sellers earned their values for the property minus tax if they did not sell, or the price 
at which they sold if they did. 
 The buyer was endowed with $350,000, which served as an opportunity cost to negotiating.  
The amount of cash was private information, but its existence was common knowledge.  If the 
buyer refused to negotiate she kept the cash.  If a buyer assembled four properties she earned her 
value plus the cash endowment minus the sum of the prices she paid minus property tax.  If a buyer 
assembled fewer than four properties she paid the sellers who accepted her offers, but sold the 
properties to the experimenter for $100,000 each. 
We randomly generated buyer and seller values for 30 negotiations and used the same value 
draws in both treatments.  Assembly was efficient in 24 (80%) of the negotiations, which we call 
the “positive-sum” negotiations.  The minimum, maximum and average available gains from trade 
in these negotiations were $5,000, $765,000 and $379,000. 
 Negotiations proceeded for up to five rounds, with three phases each:   
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 Phase one: Sellers communicated via text chat, after which they each sent a nonbinding 
price request to the buyer.  Phase one lasted for seven minutes in the first round and two 
minutes in subsequent rounds. 
 Phase two: The buyer observed the price requests and chose to either abandon the 
negotiation or simultaneously send binding offers to the sellers.  The buyer could offer 
different amounts to different sellers, but the sum of the offers could not exceed her value 
plus her cash. 
 Phase three: Sellers observed the offers and chose to accept or reject them.  They had one 
minute to communicate with one another before submitting their decision.  
If a seller rejected his offer negotiations continued to phase one of the next round.  If a 
seller accepted his offer the price at which he sold was disclosed to all sellers.  A seller who 
accepted an offer was not allowed to chat with the other sellers or see their text messages in 
subsequent rounds.  He could click a button on his user interface to launch Microsoft Paint.  We 
included this function to prevent sellers from extending negotiations to stave off boredom. 
All properties had a $100,000 assessed value.  10% of the assessed value was collected 
from the owner of the property at the end of negotiations.  (A buyer who purchased fewer than 
four properties sold them to the experimenter and so was not liable for tax.)  Reassessment on sale 
is the status quo in most US jurisdictions.  In Baseline properties were reassessed upon sale, so 
sellers who kept their property paid $10,000 in tax.  In ROR unsold properties were reassessed at 
the end of a negotiation according to the highest rejected offer.  For instance, if a seller rejected 
offers of $120,000, $135,000 and $130,000 in rounds one through three and the buyer then 
abandoned negotiations, the seller’s property would be reassessed at $135,000, and the seller 
would owe $13,500 in tax. 
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Prolonged negotiations were costly to the buyer.  The cost took the form of a multiplier 
applied to the buyer’s earnings after the negotiation.  The multiplier was 100% if the negotiation 
ended in round one.  It decreased to 95% in round 2, 90% in round 3, etc.  The multiplier was 75% 
if the buyer had not assembled all four properties (or abandoned negotiations) after round five. 
4. Results 
 Finding 1: ROR did not reduce the frequency of holdout, but did reduce its magnitude. 
 Support: We measured holdout by subtracting each seller’s tax-adjusted value from the 
highest offer they rejected.  Positive differences indicate holdout, and the value of the difference 
measures the magnitude of holdout.  In Baseline 48.3% of sellers rejected an offer exceeding their 
tax-adjusted value; in ROR it was 51.7%.  However, among sellers who did hold out, the average 
difference between the highest rejected offer and the seller’s value was $53,701.74 in Baseline and 
$26,453.76 in ROR; a 48.1% reduction. 
 We test for treatment effects in holdout frequency and magnitude using a logistic regression 
for holdout (1 = yes, 0 = no) and an OLS regression for holdout magnitude (Table 1).3  The logistic 
regression only includes observations from sellers who received an offer and the OLS regression 
only includes observations from sellers who held out.  Both models control for treatment, 
negotiation number and the seller’s tax-adjusted value.  Standard errors are clustered by group.  In 
the logistic regression the estimated coefficient for ROR is not significant (p = 0.872).  The OLS 
regression estimates the magnitude of holdout was $28,024 less in ROR than in Baseline, and the  
 
 
                                                          
3 A Heckman selection model found no significant correlation between the error terms of the frequency and 
magnitude models (ρ = -0.05, S.E. = 0.07, 95% C.I. = -0.18 to 0.08).  Thus, we estimate the models separately for 
ease of interpretation. 
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Table 1. Estimates on holdout frequency and magnitude. 
 Logistic Regression on 
Holdout Frequency 
OLS Regression on Holdout 
Magnitude 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Constant 0.88 
(1.41) 
59,037 
(40,767) 
ROR  0.05 
(0.34) 
-28,024* 
(13,042) 
Negotiation Number 0.61 
(0.35) 
14,048 
(11,686) 
Seller’s Value (in $10,000s) -0.13 
(0.10) 
-2,187 
(2,582) 
Observations 220 120 
Pseudo R2 0.023 -- 
Wald χ2 4.02 -- 
R2 -- 0.113 
F-Statistic -- 2.11 
* Significant at 5% 
 
effect is significant (p = 0.037).  Relative to the estimated constant of $59,037 this represents a 
reduction in holdout magnitude of 47.5%.   
 Finding 2: ROR increased the rate of assembly. 
 Support:  In Baseline buyers assembled all four properties in 50% of the positive-sum 
negotiations.  In ROR the assembly rate was 79.2%, a 58.4% increase.  We test for statistical 
significance with a logistic regression on a binary variable indicating assembly (1 = success, 0 = 
failure), controlling for treatment, negotiation number and amount of available surplus (in 
$10,000s) (See Table 2).  We limit the dataset to observations from the positive-sum negotiations.   
The estimated coefficient for ROR is positive and significant (p = 0.033).  Assuming the 
available surplus is the mean observed ($379,000) and participants are in their first negotiation,  
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Table 2. Estimates from logistic regression on successful assembly in positive-sum negotiations. 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Constant -0.61 
(1.18) 
ROR  1.46* 
(0.69) 
Negotiation Number -0.46 
(0.68) 
Available Surplus 
(in $10,000s) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Observations 48 
Pseudo R2 0.138 
Wald χ2 8.63 
* Significant at 5% 
 
the model estimates the Baseline probability of assembly at 55.4% compared to 84.3% in ROR - 
an increase of 52.2%. 
Buyers could ensure that it was in a seller’s financial interest to sell by making an offer 
greater than his maximum tax-adjusted value: $140,000 in Baseline and $136,363 in ROR.  Sellers 
in Baseline rejected 65.5% of such offers; sellers in ROR rejected 51.7%.  Moreover, sellers 
requested approximately $199,000 on average in Baseline, compared to $164,000 in ROR.  Seller 
recalcitrance led buyers in Baseline to quit negotiating early in 25% of the positive-sum 
negotiations compared to 4.2% in ROR. 
 Finding 3: ROR did not increase the gains from trade. 
 Support: We measure the social welfare as the surplus captured through negotiation.  The 
surplus is defined as the participants’ actual earnings minus their earnings had the buyer abandoned 
negotiations in round one.  There was $9,096,000 in available surplus in each treatment.   
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Table 3. Estimates from OLS regression on normalized surplus. 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Constant -58,950 
(63,485) 
ROR  27,322 
(38,282) 
Negotiation Number 39,300 
(33,589) 
Observations 60 
R2 0.027 
F-Statistic 0.78 
* Significant at 5% 
 
Participants in Baseline captured approximately $3,700,000 (41.1%) of this.  In ROR they captured 
about $4,600,000 (50.2%). 
 For each negotiation we subtracted the surplus that had been captured in Baseline to 
minimize the variance. We fit these differences as the dependent variable in an OLS regression 
with a treatment dummy and the negotiation number as regressors.  (See Table 3.)  The model 
estimates that participants in ROR captured $27,322 more per negotiation than in Baseline, but the 
effect is not significant (p = 0.478).   
 This null result has two causes.  First, ROR did not reduce delay.  The average negotiation 
took 3.8 rounds in Baseline and 3.83 rounds in ROR. Second, the extra assemblies in ROR were in 
negotiations with less available surplus.  Of the 50% of positive-sum negotiations with the highest 
available surplus, buyers were successful in two thirds in both Baseline and ROR.  Among the 
remaining positive-sum negotiations the assembly rate was 33.3% in Baseline and 91.7% in ROR. 
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5. Conclusion 
 We test Miceli, Segerson & Sirmans’ (2008) proposal to facilitate land assembly by re-
assessing property taxes after a refused offer from a developer.  In our laboratory experiments this 
policy is effective in reducing the amounts for which sellers hold out, and increases the rate of 
assembly by 58.4% relative to the status quo.  However, the resulting improvement to social 
welfare is not statistically significant.  The self-assessment mechanisms tested by DeSantis, Winn 
& McCarter (2017) provide a similar improvement in successful assembly along with large, 
statistically significant increases in social welfare.  Subject to political constraints, these self-
assessment mechanisms should be preferred to the re-assessment mechanism evaluated here.  
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